Following Kreps (1979) , I consider a decision maker who is uncertain about her future taste. This uncertainty leaves the decision maker with a preference for ‡exibil-ity: When choosing among menus containing alternatives for future choice, she weakly prefers menus with additional alternatives. Standard representations accommodating this choice pattern cannot distinguish tastes (indexed by a subjective state space) and beliefs (a probability measure over the subjective states) as di¤erent concepts. I allow choice between menus to depend on objective states. My axioms provide a representation that uniquely identi…es beliefs, provided objective states are su¢ ciently relevant for choice. I suggest that this result could provide choice theoretic substance to the assumption, commonly made in the (incomplete) contracting literature, that contracting parties who know each others'ranking of contracts, also share beliefs about each others'future tastes in the face of unforeseen contingencies.
Introduction
The expected utility model of von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944, henceforth vNM) explains choice under risk by considering probabilities and taste (a ranking of outcomes) separately. In the context of choice under subjective uncertainty, the corresponding separation of beliefs and tastes is a central concern. For the extreme case where all subjective uncertainty can be captured by objective states of the world, the works of Savage (1954) and Anscombe and Aumann (1963, henceforth AA) achieve this separation. In the opposing extreme, where I thank Roland Benabou and Wolfgang Pesendorfer for their invaluable advice. I am also grateful to David Dillenberger, Faruk Gul, R. Vijay Krishna, Bart Lipman, Mark Machina, Eric Maskin, Todd Sarver, Tymon Tatur, Justin Valasek, numerous seminar audiences, and four anonymous referees for helpful suggestions.
y Department of Economics, Duke University, p.sadowski@duke.edu none of the subjective uncertainty can be captured by objective states, uncertainty can be modeled with a subjective state space. Kreps (1979, henceforth Kreps) 1 …nd that the separation is not possible in this case. This is the standard indeterminacy of state dependent expected utility models.
In the general case, some, but potentially not all, subjective uncertainty can be captured by objective states. This paper analyzes a model of choice under such general subjective uncertainty, which features the AA and DLR models as special cases. 2 The model separately identi…es tastes and beliefs over those tastes, provided that objective states are "relevant enough."The main identi…cation result provides a tight behavioral characterization of relevant enough.
The timing of choice is as follows: In period 1, the decision maker (DM) chooses an opportunity act. An opportunity act speci…es a menu of alternatives for future choice contingent on the objective state. Between periods 1 and 2 an objective state realizes. In period 2 the act is evaluated and DM gets to choose from the resulting menu. Only period 1 choice is observed. If objective states do not account for all subjective uncertainty that resolves between periods 1 and 2, then DM has contingent uncertainty about her future taste. In that case, commitment to a plan of period 2 choice contingent only on the objective state is costly, and one should observe contingent preference for ‡exibility: All else being equal, DM prefers an act that assigns a menu containing more alternatives in any particular state.
This paper provides a representation of such preferences, labeled a representation of Contingent Preference for Flexibility (CPF). Subjective uncertainty that is not captured by the objective state is modeled, as in DLR, via a subjective state space, which collects all possible tastes that might govern DM's choice in period 2. I call it the taste space. DM behaves as if the objective state may be informative about her future tastes, and so conditions her beliefs about future tastes on the objective state. Contingent on the state, choice over menus has a subjective expected utility representation, as in DLR. I show that a central new axiom, Relevant Objective States, is equivalent to the unique identi…cation of utilities and conditional beliefs in this representation.
To be more speci…c, let I be the objective state space. An opportunity act, g; assigns a contingent menu of lotteries over prizes, g (i), to every objective state, i in I. The taste space, S, collects all possible vNM rankings of lotteries over prizes. In the case of …nite I, choice over acts has a CPF representation if it can be represented by
where is a probability measure on I, the realized vNM utility function U s represents taste s in S, and i (s) is a probability measure on S. The representation suggests that, while the menu of alternatives DM expects to choose from in stage 2 is determined by the objective state i; she anticipates her utility function to be fully determined by her taste s: She also expects to learn s and i prior to choosing an alternative. The measure is interpreted as DM's beliefs over I and i (s) is interpreted as the belief that taste s occurs, contingent on i. Theorem 1 takes the CPF representation and the distribution as given. 3 It establishes that conditional beliefs i (s) are unique and utilities U s are unique in an appropriate sense if and only if choice between opportunity acts satis…es the Relevant Objective States axiom. The axiom is formulated in terms of DM's ranking of menus contingent on the objective state. This ranking is derived from her choice over acts. Say that two menus are equivalent for DM, if for every contingent ranking the union of those menus is indi¤erent to each of the menus individually. Objective states are relevant if, for any two menus that are not equivalent for DM, there is an objective state contingent on which one is strictly preferred over the other. Theorem 2 states that choice over opportunity acts has a CPF representation if and only if it satis…es the immediate extensions of the state-dependent AA and DLR axioms. These axioms are necessary for a more general representation, where both beliefs and utilities depend on objective states. Given the more general representation, Theorem 2 therefore implies that the assumption that only beliefs condition on objective states does not constrain period 1 choice.
Even though the model does not capture period 2 choice from a menu explicitly, a researcher may want to forecast period 2 choice behavior. The CPF representation describes choice over menus in period 1, as if the DM held beliefs about the tastes that might govern her period 2 choice. Theorem 1 uniquely identi…es those beliefs, which are parameters of the representation, from period 1 choice. Therefore, the natural inductive step is to employ the DM's beliefs about future tastes to forecast period 2 choice behavior. There are good arguments against this inductive step. For example, one could instead make period 2 choice part of the domain, leaving less room for erroneous modeling assumptions. 4 However, an essential reason for the use of scienti…c models is to make predictions about the world based on limited data. Choice Theory is well positioned to supply such models for economic applications: Axiomatization translates limited data (here period 1 choice data) to a model, and identi…cation establishes those parameters of the model (here the beliefs) that one might base inferences on. Being able to forecast behavior can also be important in strategic situations, for example when one party's valuation of a contract depends on future actions taken by the other party. As an example that illustrates how the CPF representation can apply to the evaluation of contracts, consider a retailer, who writes a contract with her supplier today about tomorrow's order. The demand, s; facing the retailer tomorrow will be either high (h) or low (l). Today s is unknown to both parties, tomorrow it will become the private knowledge of the retailer. (While demand is observable in many situations, unobservable demand levels here simply serve as convenient labels for the di¤erent unobservable pro…t functions the retailer can conceive of.) The only relevant public information that becomes available tomorrow is consumer con…dence, i; a general market indicator, which will also be either high (H) or low (L) : Thus, a contract, g; can only condition on consumer con…dence, not on demand. The most e¢ cient contract might give the retailer some choice of supply quantities, q, contingent on consumer con…dence; consider this type of contract. From the retailer's perspective, the contract is an act in the terminology of this paper. Routinely one might write down the following objective function for the retailer's choice between contracts:
First, take consumer con…dence, i 2 fH; Lg, as given. The retailer can then order any quantity in g (i). If tomorrow she faces demand s 2 fh; lg, she will choose the quantity q that maximizes her pro…ts, U s (q) : Today she does not know tomorrow's demand, but she can assign probabilities conditional on consumer con…dence, i (s). She values the menu g (i) at its expected value, P s2fh;lg i (s) max
(U s (q)). Second, she takes an expectation over di¤erent levels of consumer con…dence according to a probability distribution : This is an example of a CPF representation.
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Section 2 investigates under what conditions beliefs are identi…ed in the example above. In the body of the paper the objective state space, I, is assumed to be …nite. Section 3 lays out the model and establishes Theorems 1 and 2. Section 4 contains Theorem 3, which combines the two results and elicits beliefs on I from choice. Section 5 discusses related literature. Section 6 comments in more detail on possible implications for contracting. Appendix A provides existence and identi…cation results for the case of a general measurable objective state space. Most proofs are relegated to Appendix B.
Illustration of Identi…cation of Beliefs
In this section, I consider three cases of a CPF representation: when none of the subjective uncertainty can be captured by objective states (irrelevant objective states); when all of the subjective uncertainty can be captured by objective states (no preference for ‡exibility); and the general case, where some, but not all, of the subjective uncertainty can be captured by objective states (preference for ‡exibility and relevant objective states). To illustrate these cases, I use the setup of the above example, but where …nal outcomes are lotteries, ; over quantities.
Irrelevant objective states: Suppose that the retailer's beliefs are independent of consumer con…dence; that is H (h) = L (h) = (h) and
In this case, her induced ranking of menus is independent of consumer con…dence. Hence, for the purpose of identifying beliefs , it is without loss of generality to consider only contracts with
If g is such a non-contingent contract, then
This is an example of DLR's representation. To see that beliefs are not identi…ed, consider a di¤erent probability distribution b (s) on S = fh; lg and rescaled utilities b
6 Ozdenoren (2002) provides a model that generalizes this example, as discussed in Section 5. This is the fundamental indeterminacy in the Kreps and DLR models and variations of those models.
No preference for ‡exibility: Suppose that H (h) = 1 and L (h) = 0. This is the unique (up to relabeling) speci…cation of beliefs where subjective uncertainty is perfectly captured by the objective states, and none of the contingent rankings exhibit preference for ‡exibility. In this case it is without loss of generality to identify h with H and l with L, and one can con…ne attention to contracts with lotteries, instead of menus, as outcomes: If g (i) = i is such a fully speci…ed contract, then
This is an example of AA's state-dependent representation.
Preference for ‡exibility and relevant objective states: Lastly, suppose the retailer believes that the probability of high demand is increasing with consumer con…dence; that is,
Further suppose that there is another representation of the same ranking of contracts based on beliefs over objective states, b , conditional beliefs, b i (s), and tastes, b U s :
V and b V have to generate the same ranking of contracts. Consider two quantities (or degenerate lotteries), q h and q l , such that the retailer prefers to receive q h if demand is high and q l if demand is low, that is, U h (q h ) U h (q l ) > 0 and
Slightly abusing notation, I denote a lottery that gives q h with probability and q l with probability 1 by : I denote the menu that contains lotteries and by f ; g : Suppose for some < and ; " 2 (0; 1 ) the retailer is indi¤erent between the two contracts
< implies that is relevant for the value of these contracts only under taste h. Hence,
An analogous equality must hold for the parameters of b U : Therefore,
If probabilities of objective states are objective, that is, b = , then
and similarly
Since and b are both probability measures,
Standard arguments, applied to the comparison of contracts which disagree only under state i, imply that the expected utility functions b U h and b U l can only di¤er from their respective counterparts U h and U l by a common linear transformation and the addition of constants. This argument illustrates how identi…cation relies crucially on the fact that beliefs over objective states are held …xed. More generally, it makes clear why it is necessary to observe the retailer's choice between contracts (opportunity acts), and not just her ranking of menus contingent on each objective state: the willingness to tradeo¤ payo¤s across objective states (captured by the indi¤erence between contracts g and g 0 ) determines the relative weight assigned to taste h under objective state H versus L.
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The above reasoning can be generalized to any …nite state space, I. If a CPF representation has the feature that there are at least as many linearly independent probability measures over the taste space, indexed by i 2 I, as there are relevant tastes, then beliefs are uniquely identi…ed and the scaling of utilities is uniquely identi…ed up to a common linear transformation. The next section develops a general model of choice between opportunity acts and characterizes, in terms of behavior, all preferences that have a CPF representation with this feature.
A Model with Unique Beliefs
Consider a two-stage choice problem, where an objective state realizes between the two stages. In period 2 DM chooses a lottery over prizes. In period 1 DM chooses an opportunity act. Such an act is a state contingent speci…cation of a set of lotteries (a menu) that contains the feasible alternatives for period 2 choice.
Let Z be a …nite prize space with cardinality k and typical elements x; y; z. (Z) is the space of all lotteries over Z with typical elements ; ; . When there is no risk of confusion,
x also denotes the degenerate lottery that assigns unit weight to x. Let A be the collection of all compact subsets of (Z) with menus A; B; C as typical elements. 8 Further, let I be a …nite objective state space with typical elements i; j. Let F be the -algebra generated by the power set of I, where i; j 2 I also denote elementary events.
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Let G be the set of all opportunity acts with typical elements g; h. An opportunity act is a measurable function g : I ! A. If state i realizes, DM gets to choose an alternative from the menu g (i) 2 A. This choice is not modeled explicitly. Instead, is a binary relation on G G; < and are de…ned the usual way.
The following concepts are important throughout the paper.
De…nition 1:
The convex combination of menus is de…ned as
The convex combination of opportunity acts is de…ned, such that
To de…ne DM's induced ranking of menus A and B contingent on state i 2 I, consider acts g 8 Compactness is not essential. If menus were not compact, maximum and minimum would have to be replaced by supremum and in…mum, respectively, in all that follows. 9 The case of a general measurable space (I; F) is relegated to Appendix A. In period 2, objects of choice are lotteries over the prize space. The taste space (the collection of all conceivable period 2 tastes) is the collection of all vNM rankings of lotteries. The following de…nition is due to DLRS.
is the taste space. 10 Let B be the Borel -algebra on S.
S collects all possible realized vNM utilities, twice normalized. Every taste in S is a vector with k components where each entry can be thought of as specifying the relative utility associated with the corresponding prize.
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De…nition 4: Call ( ; ; U ) a Contingent Preference for Flexibility (CPF) representation of the preference relation , if is a probability measure on I; = f i g i2I is a collection of probability measures on (S; B), and U = fU s g s2S is a family of vNM utilities on (Z), integrable in s, where U s represents taste s and the objective function
represents .
If U s is a vNM representation of taste s, then it must have the form
where s is the dot product of state s and lottery , l (s) is the "intensity" of taste s and b s is a constant. The relative intensity of utilities together with beliefs determines how DM trades o¤ gains across tastes. The constants b s have no behavioral content. This motivates the next de…nition. S can be thought of as the set of tastes DM considers possible. An axiomatization of the CPF representation is given in Theorem 2. The distribution is identi…ed from behavior in Theorem 3. The main concern, however, is to separately identify beliefs and tastes U , provided that DM's choice over acts has a CPF representation for a given distribution .
The main new axiom of this paper can be paraphrased as follows: if two menus are not equivalent for DM, in the sense that they provide her with the same utility under every relevant taste, then there exists an objective state contingent on which one is preferred over the other. A [ B must sometimes be in A and sometimes in B. Axiom 1 requires that there exists a contingent ranking for which either one or the other case becomes more important, namely that there is j 2 I with A j B.
14 Axiom 1 is not a strong assumption in the sense that it is local; it only requires breaking indi¤erence. For comparison, AA require that there is no relevant subjective uncertainty, contingent on the state of the world. That is, choice between menus would have to satisfy 12 The support of a measure is the closure of the collection of points, for which every neighborhood in B has positive measure. 13 Implicit in the interpretation is that, ultimately, only the chosen item matters for the value of a menu. 14 state contingent strategic rationality:
15 In terms of the example from the introduction, consumer con…dence (the objective state) may be relevant for the retailer's beliefs about her desire to order a large or a small quantity, but it is conceivable that the retailer prefers a large quantity even when con…dence is low and vice versa. This notion is weaker than the assumption of state contingent strategic rationality, according to which the retailer always prefers the large quantity when con…dence is high and the small quantity when con…dence is low.
Theorem 1:
If has a CPF representation ( ; ; U ), then statements (i) -(iii) below are equivalent: i)
satis…es Axiom 1, ii) and U are unique given , iii) the cardinality of S equals the number of linearly independent elements in f i g i2I .
If a decision maker behaves as if she has preference for ‡exibility because of uncertainty about her future taste, updates her beliefs over tastes when learning the objective state, and maximizes her expected utility according to objective probabilities over those states, then her preferences satisfy Axiom 1 if and only if her beliefs over future tastes are determined uniquely. This identi…cation gives meaning to the description of beliefs and tastes as distinct concepts. Lack of this distinction is the central drawback of previous work on preference for ‡exibility, starting with Kreps.
Another di¢ culty in the application and interpretation of models of preference for ‡exi-bility is the in…nite subjective state space. Item (iii) in Theorem 1 conveniently constrains the space of relevant tastes, S , to be smaller than I, which is …nite. Axiom 1 implies this …niteness, because I must be rich enough to distinguish between any two menus for which DM might have preference for ‡exibility. This implies that only …nitely many lotteries can be appreciated in any menu. Theorem 1 0 in the appendix generalizes the result and considers I to be a general topological space, lifting the constraint on the cardinality of S . Finally, given a particular CPF representation of , item (iii) in Theorem 1 provides a criterion to check whether or not satis…es Axiom 1. This criterion is illustrated in the example in Section 2.
To see how relevant objective states imply unique beliefs and utilities, …x the distribution of objective states, , and suppose there were two CPF representations of the same preference relation, ( ; ; U ) and ; b ; b U with corresponding value functions
Neglecting additive constants, additive separability of the representations implies
for all i 2 I and for some > 0. Suppose further that for the contingent ranking i one could construct menus K i b K, such that K generates constant utility payo¤ across tastes according to ( ; ; U ) and b K according to ; b ; b U . On the one hand,
On the other hand, changing the objective state from i to j only changes DM's beliefs about her future tastes. If a menu generates the same utility payo¤ for every taste, then the conditional value of the menu is independent of the objective state:
K would have to hold for all j 2 I . At the same time, if ( ; ; U ) and ; b ; b U were distinct, b K would not generate constant utility payo¤s across tastes according to ( ; ; U ) ; because utility payo¤s depend on the intensities of U and b U , respectively. Therefore
then imply that there is j 2 I with K j b K, a contradiction. This rough intuition does not quite work, because the construction of menus that generate the same utility payo¤ for every taste is not always possible. Because S S is …nite, however, one can construct pairs of menus (A; B for ( ; ; U ) and b A; b B for ; b ; b U ) for which the di¤erence in utility payo¤s is constant across tastes. Let K be the convex combination of menus
Ozdenoren (2002) analyzes the case where Axiom 1 fails completely, in the sense that objective states are irrelevant to the decision maker. Then, only the support of the probability measures i which allow a representation can be identi…ed. This is the same indeterminacy encountered in DLR.
In addition to the key role that objective states play in Axiom 1, the fact that menus consist of lotteries is also important for the identi…cation of beliefs. Nehring (1999) …nds that acts with menus of prizes as outcomes do not allow the separate identi…cation of tastes and beliefs in the axiomatic setup developed by Savage (1954) . To establish the uniqueness result, the payo¤ generated by a menu must be varied independently for di¤erent tastes. This is possible only because DM can be o¤ered lotteries over prizes.
Remark: A remark on the interpretation of tastes, or subjective states, is in order. Suppose for a moment that there is an underlying state space , which provides a complete description of all relevant aspects of the world. That is, ! 2 even determines DM's taste, s 2 S. In that case, S generates a sub -algebra on . The question is to what extent is observable. Let I be the collection of observable events i , where I generates another sub -algebra on . Now consider a probability measure on representing DM's beliefs. If there is no correlation between events in I and events in S; then the induced marginal distribution i (s) is independent of i, and the objective state space can be dropped from the description of the model, as in DLR. For example, could be the product space I S and a product measure. If, in the other extreme, there is perfect correlation between events in I and events in S; then I itself can play the role of the complete objective state space in (the state dependent version of) the AA model. Theorem 1 is concerned with the general case of some, but not perfect correlation. The examples in Section 2 illustrate the three cases.
I now establish existence of a CPF representation. As mentioned above, the axioms are direct extensions of familiar assumptions.
Axiom 2 (Preference):
is asymmetric and negatively transitive.
Axiom 4 (Independence): If for g; g 0 2 G, g g 0 and if p 2 (0; 1), then
If a convex combination of menus were de…ned as a lottery over menus, then the motivation of Independence in my setup would be the same as in more familiar contexts. Uncertainty would resolve before DM consumes an item from one of the menus. However, following DLR and Gul and Pesendorfer (2001), I de…ne the convex combination of menus as the menu containing all the convex combinations of their elements. The uncertainty generated by the convex combination is only resolved after DM chooses an item from this new menu. Gul and Pesendorfer term the additional assumption needed to motivate Independence in this setup "indi¤erence as to when uncertainty is resolved." Axiom 5 (Nontriviality): There are g,h 2 G, such that g h.
The next axiom considers DM's contingent ranking of menus, i . As long as some subjective uncertainty is not captured by objective states, i should exhibit preference for ‡exibility. This is captured by the central axiom in Kreps, which states that larger menus are weakly better than smaller menus: Axiom 6 (Monotonicity): A [ B < i A for all A; B 2 A and all i 2 I.
Lemma 1:
If satis…es Axioms 2-6, then i is a preference relation and satis…es the appropriate variants of vNM Continuity, Independence and Monotonicity for all i 2 I. Furthermore, there is a nonnull event i 2 I.
The proof is immediate.
Theorem DLRS (Theorem 2 in DLRS): For i 2 I nonnull, i is a preference that satis…es the appropriate variants of vNM Continuity, Independence and Monotonicity if and only if there is a subjective state space S i , a positive countably additive measure i on S i , and a set of non-constant and continuous expected utility functions U s;i : (Z) ! R, such that
represents i and every vNM ranking of lotteries in (Z) corresponds to at most one state in S i . 16 Because U s;i ( ) are realized vNM utility functions, the subjective state space S i can be replaced by the taste space S for all i 2 I. Note that the taste space does not include the taste where DM is indi¤erent between all prizes, implicitly assuming nontriviality of the ex-post preferences over prizes.
Theorem 2:
The binary relation satis…es Axioms 2-6 if and only if it has a CPF representation.
Proof: See Appendix B.
The proof …rst employs the Mixture Space Theorem to establish an additively separable 16 See footnotes 3 and 5 in DLRS.
representation of . That is,
) represents for some family of utility functions, fv i g i2I ; on A, where v i are unique up to a common positive linear transformation and the addition of constants. 17 Now consider some linear representation, b v i , of i on A. Since v i also represents i , the Mixture Space Theorem implies that v i agrees with b v i up to scaling. The scaling is absorbed by (i), which is then normalized to be a probability distribution. Thus,
represents . Note that this is AA's state-dependent representation, with the exception that opportunity acts have menus as outcomes, while AA acts have lotteries as outcomes. Indeed, Axioms 2-4 imply AA's axioms. Furthermore, Axioms 2-6 imply DLRS'axioms, as shown in Lemma 1. According to Theorem DLRS, i can then be represented by
where b i is a probability measure on S and b U s;i is a vNM utility function that represents taste s 2 S, that is, b U s;i and b U s;j are identical up to a positive a¢ ne transformation. Pick any j 2 I and de…ne U s := b U s;j . The lack of identi…cation in DLRS implies that there is a measure i on S, such that i (s) U s / b i (s) b U s;i . Therefore, i can be represented by
for all i 2 I. Since V i is linear, there is a CPF representation ( ; ; U ); that is,
represents . The intensity of each taste is endogenous, but it is …xed across objective states. Clearly Axioms 2-6 are also necessary for the generic combination of the AA and DLRS representations,
where objective states impact not only probabilities, i , but also the intensities of tastes. Theorem 2 implies that there is a CPF representation of whenever the more general representation b V exists. Therefore, the assumption that only beliefs condition on objective states does not constrain period 1 choice.
Probabilities over Objective States
Theorem 1 takes the distribution on I and a CPF representation ( ; ; U ) as given and establishes that and U are unique in the appropriate sense if and only if objective states are relevant. might be objective in the sense that it corresponds to observed frequencies of objective states, or it might be subjective, in which case it must also be elicited from behavior. The unique identi…cation of is analogous to the classical problem addressed by AA. There, the unique identi…cation of probabilities of observable states is based on the assumption of state independence of the ranking of outcomes. The di¤erence is that they consider acts with lotteries (instead of menus of lotteries) as outcomes, so there is no room for preference for ‡exibility in their setup. In my setup, the combination of objective state independence and Axiom 1 would rule out any preference for ‡exibility. Thus, the independence assumption has to be con…ned to a proper subset A to be useful here. Having assumed state independent rankings, AA consider only cardinally state independent rankings (or state independent utilities). This cannot be assumed in terms of an axiom. Instead it is a constraint on the class of representations for which they establish their uniqueness result. For the CPF representation it would amount to requiring that R
A is a generic collection of menus, then this might not be consistent with , which applies to all of G.
18 Thus, the requirement must be con…ned to a particular collection of menus.
De…nition 6: Let X Z denote a set of prizes and (X) the set of all lotteries with support in X. Let ( (X)) A be the set of all menus of lotteries that have support in X.
De…nition 7: A CPF representation, ( ; ; U ), is state-independent with respect to X Z,
) and all i; j 2 I . Further, ( ; ; U ) is the unique CPF representation that is state-independent with respect to X, if for any other CPF representation b ; b ; b U that is state-independent with respect to X, b , 18 For a simple example of such inconsistency consider = ff g ; f g ; f gg but, for some p 2 (0; 1) and i; j 2 I, fp 
To illustrate Axiom 7, consider X = f$1; $0g to consist of the prizes "1 dollar"and "nothing." The …rst part of Axiom 7 then requires that the ranking of menus that consist only of lotteries that pay out either $1 or nothing must be state-independent. To motivate the requirement, it is su¢ cient to assume that the value of $1 (versus nothing) is state-independent. The assumption does not require that DM is certain about his taste, but only that the objective state is uninformative about this uncertainty.
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Theorem 3: The binary relation satis…es Axioms 1-7 if and only if there exists some non-degenerate X Z, such that has a unique CPF representation that is state independent with respect to X, ( ; ; U ). In this representation U s (x) is constant across S for all x 2 X. Since U s (x) is constant across S for all x 2 X, it follows immediately that there is no preference for ‡exibility with respect to alternatives in (X). To see why this must be the case, consider menus A; B 2 ( (X)) with A i B for some i 2 I. By Axiom 7, A j B 19 Naturally, certainty about (some aspects of) tastes would also identify beliefs, as DLR observe. For a brief discussion, see section 5. 20 In the case where is objective, it is possible to strengthen Axiom 7, such that the unique CPF representation in Theorem 3 is based on : Axiom (Objective Probabilities): There is X Z, such that for A; B 2 ( (X)) and nontrivial D and
This implies Axiom 8. It also implies that V g
for all j 2 I. Now suppose that there was preference for ‡exibility with respect to those menus, A [ B i 0 A for some i 0 2 I. By Axiom 1, A j B for some j 2 I, which is a contradiction. 21 
Related Literature
Ozdenoren (2002) also considers Preference for Flexibility in the presence of objective states of the world. Instead of Relevant Objective States (Axiom 1), which ensures that contingent rankings are su¢ ciently di¤erent, he assumes that all contingent rankings are the same. Consequently, beliefs over tastes are not identi…ed in his model. I know of three other identi…cation results that deliver unique beliefs over future tastes for consumption in models of preference for ‡exibility. First, note that AA's identi…cation of unique beliefs over objective states does not require full state independence of preferences. 22 In analogy to AA's argument, beliefs over tastes in the DLR model can be identi…ed uniquely, as long as DM has no preference for ‡exibility with respect to part of the prize space. As an example, DLR suggest to consider a DM without preference for ‡exibility on one dimension of a product prize space (Shenone (2010) provides details.) Second, Ahn and Sarver (2012) provide a model that requires both choice between as well as random choice from menus to be observable. Their model restricts the beliefs that feature in the representation of choice between menus to correspond to the choice frequencies that describe choice from menus. Finally, in a dynamic model of preference for ‡exibility, Krishna and Sadowski (2011) show that the DM's attitude towards intertemporal tradeo¤ can also uniquely identify beliefs. They proceed to characterize a behavioral comparison of "greater preference for ‡exibility" in terms of a stochastic dominance condition on the beliefs. Without identi…cation of beliefs, such a comparison is not possible. 23 The domain of opportunity acts is …rst analyzed by Nehring (1999) , and the notion of contingent menus appears in Epstein (2006) . Following Nehring (1996), a companion paper to Nehring (1999), Epstein and Seo (2009) consider a domain of random menus, which are lotteries with menus as outcomes. On this domain they establish unique induced probability distributions over ex post upper contour sets as the strongest possible uniqueness statement. 21 Once AA restrict attention to representations with state-independent utilities, there is no arbitrariness in their model. In contrast, strict preference for ‡exibility implies that X is a proper subset of Z: Hence, could satisfy Axiom 7 for some X and Y with X 6 = Y , but not for X [ Y . Either those menus with support in X or those with support in Y could then be assigned a cardinal ranking, which is state-independent. The two assumptions clearly lead to di¤erent representations. The following assumption would rule out this scenario: If satis…es Axiom 7 for X Z and for Y Z, then it also satis…es the condition for X [ Y . 22 This insight also underlies the elicitation of beliefs, ; over objective states in Section 4 of this paper. 23 Limited by the lack of identi…cation in their model, DLR suggest an alternative notion which can be characterized in terms of the support of the beliefs. Theorem 1 does not only provide unique beliefs, but also establishes the …niteness of the collection of relevant tastes, S . Dekel, Lipman and Rustichini (2009) and Kopylov (2009) generate …niteness of S in the absence of objective states by basically assuming that the number of lotteries DM can appreciate in any given menu is limited.
Finally, note that the state-independent version of AA's representation can be viewed as a special case of a unique CPF representation, where there is only one taste and the intensity of this one taste is independent of the objective state. Karni and coauthors, for example Grant and Karni (2005) , Karni (2008) , and Karni (2011a and 2011b), elaborate the point that interpreting AA's or Savage's (1954) unique subjective probabilities of observable states as DM's true beliefs may be misleading, in case the true intensity of her only taste is actually not state independent. The CPF model is not immune to this concern: Even if choice has a CPF representation, DM's true intensities of tastes might not actually be state independent. Similarly, the DM might not actually use the expected utility criterion to evaluate uncertain prospects, or alternatives other than the one that is ultimately chosen might also generate utility. None of those modeling assumptions remain innocuous, once beliefs are used to forecast period 2 choice.
Asymmetric Information and Contracts
The CPF model interprets choice between acts in terms of unique state contingent beliefs over future tastes. As discussed in the introduction, considering those beliefs as predictors of future choice is an additional assumption. 24 Suppose in a particular situation it is commonly assumed that the DM's beliefs over tastes provide an accurate forecast of future choice. Conceptually, an observer could agree on those beliefs, as the DM's future choice is potentially observable. The identi…cation of beliefs from behavior is necessary to render such agreement behaviorally meaningful. In this sense my model makes it possible to talk about "common priors over tastes," just like the identi…cation of beliefs in the work of Savage (1954) makes it possible to talk about common priors over objective states. The (incomplete) contracting literature routinely assumes that both players have common priors over each other's future tastes. 25 This allows each player to rank all contracts even if her valuation of a contract depends on the other player's future choice. It follows immediately that both players also know each other's ranking of contracts. However, the assumption of commonly known rankings neither implies common beliefs over future tastes, nor does it 24 That is, beliefs correspond to choice frequencies. The assumption that beliefs are meaningful beyond their role in the representation of individual choice also underlies the notion of "objective probabilities" on which all agents can agree, even if they behave di¤erently. 25 Section 3 in Maskin and Tirole (1999) elaborates this point.
imply that players know each other's beliefs. The weaker assumption of commonly known rankings is usually justi…ed by some informal story of learning from past observations. This assumption is not my focus, and I adopt it without doing the game theoretic complexity of the contracting problem justice. Instead, I address the stronger assumption of common beliefs. This assumption is particularly troubling in the context of indescribable or unforeseen contingencies, 26 where it seems natural that each party has an informational advantage with regards to their own future taste. In a survey on incomplete contracts, Tirole (1999) speculates that "... there may be interesting interaction between "unforeseen contingencies" and asymmetric information. There is a serious issue as to how parties [...] end up having common beliefs ex ante." My domain is well suited to describe the type of (incomplete) contracts illustrated in the introduction, where player one is given some control rights contingent on observable states, I. For those contracts the CPF representation gives choice theoretic substance to the assumption of common beliefs 27 and even suggests a possible mechanism for their convergence:
If player one (the controlling party) is more knowledgeable about her own future taste, and if her beliefs can be deduced from her commonly known ranking of contracts, then player two should view those beliefs as the true probability distribution of player one's future taste, and adopt them as his own beliefs when evaluating contracts. For instance, in the example of the introduction, suppose the supplier prefers to supply the large quantity to the retailer. He then assigns a higher value to a contract that gives control over the supplied quantity to the retailer, if he expects the retailer to order the large quantity more frequently. Further, suppose the retailer is better informed about her own future pro…t function (or taste), and hence the probability with which she will order the large quantity. The supplier would want to learn this information from the retailer before agreeing to a contracts. In contrast, the supplier does not care about the intensity of the retailer's taste. In my axiomatic setup these two are distinct concepts, and the supplier can elicit the probability distribution over the retailer's future tastes from her ranking of contracts.
Appendix A -Measurable Objective State Space
If the objective state space I is …nite as in the body of the paper, then Axiom 1 limits the cardinality of the space of relevant tastes, S . In many standard models the state space is 26 Kreps (1992) points out that a subjective taste space naturally accounts for contingencies that are not just unobservable or indescribable, but unforeseen, at least by the observer. 27 Dekel, Lipman and Rustichini (1998-a) note that "... there are very signi…cant problems to be solved before we can generate interesting conclusions for contracting [...] while the Kreps model (and its modi…ca-tions) seems appropriate for unforeseen contingencies, [...] there are no meaningful subjective probabilities. A re…nement of the model that pins down probabilities would be useful." in…nite, for example the objective state space in Savage (1954) and possibly also the space of relevant subjective states in DLR. In most applications this is a disadvantage, as a …nite subjective state space is interpretationally appealing and analytically convenient. However, for those applications where an in…nite subjective state space is necessary, my results can be extended to the case when I is in…nite, thereby removing the constraint on the cardinality of S .
Let F be a -algebra on I. In this context, let G be the collection of simple opportunity acts with typical elements g; h. A simple opportunity act is a measurable function g : I ! A, such that there exists a …nite and measurable partition fD t jt 2 f1; ::; T gg of I with g(i) = g(j) if there is D 2 fD t jt 2 f1; ::; T gg with i; j 2 D. is a binary relation on G G. 28 The de…nition of D for D 2 F is analogous to the de…nition of i , De…nition 2. De…nition 4 of the CPF representation remains valid, where the value function now takes the form
where is a countably additive probability measure on (I; F), and where is a well de…ned stochastic kernel between (I; F) and (S; B). De…nitions and results that generalize those in Section 3 are distinguished by a prime on their label. ii) and U are unique given , if for any other CPF representation ; b ; b U of the functions b and induce the same kernel between the measurable spaces (I ; F ) and (S; B), and there is a > 0 and an integrable function b :
The next de…nition provides a measure of how much set A is preferred over set B in terms of how much the menu corresponding to the entire prize space, Z, is preferred over the worst prize. 
If two sequences of menus, hA n i and hB n i, converge to the same limit in the Hausdor¤ topology, then the cost of choosing from B n instead of A n vanishes under every event. However, the ratio of such costs may have a well de…ned limit. Proof: See Appendix B.
The discussion of the equivalence between (i) and (ii) in Theorem 1 applies here. The intuition for the proof of this equivalence involves identifying taste s 2 S via two menus, where one is preferred over the other under taste s, but they generate the same payo¤ under every other relevant taste. If S is continuous, however, then making a menu less preferred by a …nite amount under one taste will invariably make it worse under similar tastes (where tastes are viewed as vectors in R k + ,) too. Therefore, individual tastes can only be identi…ed in the limit where the less preferred and the more preferred menu approach each other. In this limit, the cost of choosing from the less preferred menu instead of the more preferred menu tends to zero. Axiom 1 0 allows statements about the limit of the ratio of these costs for two di¤erent pairs of menus. In addition to Axioms 2-6, an axiomatization of the CPF representation requires that "small"events do not matter too much for the ranking of acts.
De…nition 10: For f; g 2 G and D 2 F, let f Dg be the act, such that
Axiom 8 (Event-Continuity): For any three acts f; g; h 2 G with h g and any sequence fD t g in F with D t+1 D t and T t D t = ;, there exists T , such that h f D t g for all t > T .
Theorem 2 0 :
The binary relation satis…es Axioms 2-6 and 8 if and only if it has a CPF representation.
I do not provide a generalization of Theorem 3 here. It would have to be based on a theory that generalizes AA's results to the case of an in…nite objective state space. Fishburn (1979) provides such a generalization in Section 13.3.
Appendix B
After collecting some useful properties of support functions, 29 results are established in the order they appear in the text. Lemma 2: For " 0 small enough, " := " is a support function.
The hyperplane that contains the k 1 dimensional simplex of lotteries, (Z) ; is H (Z) = x 2 R k jx 1 = 1 : These two hyperplanes are parallel. Choose " small enough such that the k 1 dimensional ball B " H (Z) with radius " around the center of the simplex is itself inside the simplex, B " (Z). Then B" ". In particular, the degenerate menu B 0 that contains only the center of the simplex (the lottery that assigns weight 1=k to every prize), has support function 0.
Proof of Theorem 1
Proof of Theorem 1, (i))(iii): Let I I be a largest (in terms of cardinality) subset of linearly independent elements in f i g i2I . Then #S #I must trivially hold. It has to be shown that #S = #I : Suppose to the contrary that #S > #I . The de…nition of S implies that one can …nd at least #I + 1 distinct Borel sets with non-empty interior, fS t g
#I +1 t=1
; such that for all t #I +1 there exists i 2 I with i (int (S t )) > 0. Since i can have at most countably many atoms, one can further guarantee i (Cl (S t ) \ Cl (S t 0 )) = 0 for all t; t 0 #I + 1 and all i 2 I : Up to a constant, the vNM expected utility U s ( ) in De…nition 4 can be written as
As in the text, l (s) captures the "intensity"of taste s:
Claim 1: Given S t , there is " small enough and a support function t , such that t = " on SnS t ; t " on S t and x t (i) :
Proof of Claim 1:
Remember that " supports a ball, B " ; with radius " around the center of the simplex. The maximal menu B with B " on SnS t includes all lotteries with s " for all s 2 SnS t : This implies max 2B ( s) > " for all s in the non-empty interior of S t : Hence, B > " must hold on int(S t ). Let t := B : k For x t is as de…ned in Claim 1,
is a system of #I independent linear equations with #I + 1 variables fp t g t2f1;#I +1g , and therefore has a nonzero solution, P jp t j > 0. Dividing each p t by P jp t j yields another solution with P jp t j = 1: The convex combination of …nitely many menus is well de…ned, and by property (ii) in the previous sub-section, the convex combination of …nitely many support functions is, too. Thus one can de…ne two support functions
where t and " are as in Claim 1. Then . The value function b V that corresponds to ; b ; b U is numerically identical to V , and therefore ; b ; b U also represents . This contradicts the uniqueness statement in Theorem 1 ii). Thus, Axiom 1 is necessary for this uniqueness statement.
Proof of Theorem 1, (iii))(ii): Suppose ( ; ; U ) and ; b ; b U both represent . Given the …niteness of S , the argument from the third example in Section 2 trivially generalizes to imply that
for all i; j 2 I and s 2 S . In particular, b i (s) = b 1 (s) 1 (s) i (s) for all i 2 I and s 2 S . Since b i is a probability measure on S for all i 2 I ,
By (iii) this system has #S linearly independent equations in the #S variables
Hence the obvious solution
= 1 for all s 2 S is unique. This establishes the uniqueness of .
Given the uniqueness of , the uniqueness of U up to a common rescaling and the addition of constants follows from the identi…cation result in DLR.
Proof of Theorem 2
De…nition 13: As in the proof of Theorem 1, let A be the collection of all convex subsets of (Z). Let G be the collection of all acts: g : I ! A. Call g 2 G a convex valued act.
The proof proceeds to establish that for every act g there is a convex valued g, such that g (i) i g (i) for all i 2 I and thus, by Independence, g g. Additive separability across I is established for convex valued acts. Thus, the act g can be evaluated by …nding the act g and calculating its value state by state. Finally, Theorem DLRS provides a representation of i that allows replacing the value of g (i) with the subjective expectation of the value of g (i).
Lemma 3:
constrained to G satis…es Axioms 2-4 if and only if there is a family of continuous linear functions
represents on G. Moreover, if there is another family of continuous linear functions fv According to Theorem DLRS, i can be represented by
for all i 2 I , where U s;i is a vNM utility function that represents taste s, that is, for any
.
allows i to be represented by 
). Hence, g h if and
represents . Since v is unique only up to positive a¢ ne transformations, (i) can be normalized to be a probability measure, (i). This establishes the su¢ ciency statement in Theorem 2. In this particular CPF representation, the non-uniqueness of the representation has been exploited to normalize the state independent utilities, U s , as suggested in DLRS. That Axioms 2-6 are necessary for the existence of the representation is straightforward to verify.
Proof of Theorem 3 (Existence)
If has a CPF representation, then Axiom 7 implies that there is no preference for ‡exibility on (X ). That is, A i B implies A i A [ B for all A; B 2 (X ) and for all i 2 I. To see this, suppose to the contrary that there was preference for ‡exibility on (X ), that is, there are menus A; B (X ) with A [ B i A and A i B for some i 2 I. But then Axiom 1 would imply that there exists j 2 I, such that A j B, which contradicts Axiom 7.
Consider the CPF representation from Theorem 2:
Fix s 0 2 S . The fact that there is no preference for ‡exibility on (X ) implies that for and (i) := ) ld I (s) < ": For 0 > there are also support functions 0 and 0 , such that
30 If information is ignored, in the sense that DM only gets to choose between degenerate acts that do not condition on information, then preferences can be represented as in DLRS. The measure corresponds to the measure featured in this representation. It is dominated by the measure (s jI ) and the Radon-Nikodym derivative of with respect to (: jI ) evaluated in s is l (s) ; the intensity of taste s: 31 l (s) = 0 corresonds to the trivial state, which is not part of the CPF representation. 
Claim 4 (Lemma 1.7.9. in Schneider (1993)): The functions that are the di¤erence of two support functions span a cone that is dense in C (S) ; the space of continuous functions on S; the unit sphere in R k :
Claim 4 implies that for every " > 0 there are two support functions and and a number > 0, such that Z
for every measurable set S 0 S: Hence, Continuity of the integral implies that it is possible to chooseh n i, h n i,
for all n > 0, and hence Claim 5:
Proof: First note that
for every measurable set S 0 S and for all n > 0 implies that (i) lim 
for all D 2 F. As in the case of …nite I it is easy to verify that the fact that the limits are independent of D is meaningful in terms of . 32 That is, since ( ; ; U ) and ; b ; b U both represent , there is also a sequence of numbers h n i, such that lim
Together with observation (ii) above this implies that Proof: First, note that
Hence, on the one hand, In analogy to De…nition 13, let G be the collection of all simple convex valued acts. Let G fDtg G be the collection of all acts that are measurable with respect to the partition fD t g of I in F. v Dt (g (D t )) for g 2G \ G fDtg represents on G, which is item i).
The uniqueness statement follows immediately from the uniqueness in Lemma 3, where …nite additivity of b is implied by property (ii). That the representation implies continuity and linearity of v and, thus, the axioms is obvious.
As in the proof of Lemma 2, let B 0 denote the degenerate menu that contains only the center of the simplex (Z). Given a collection of functions v Claim 8: is a countably additive probability measure on fD S 0 jD 2 F; S 0 2 B g.
Proof:
Countable additivity with respect to F follows immediately from the expression for V above, when choosing g such that g(D) (s) = " for all s 2 S and all D 2 F, which is possible by Lemma 2. Fixing D 2 F, countable additivity with respect to B follows from Theorem DLRS, which implies that D is a countably additive measure (not necessarily a probability measure). k Claim 8 states that is countably additive on fD S 0 jD 2 F; S 0 2 B g ; which is a semiring of sets. It can, therefore, be extended to a countably additive probability measure on the product -algebra are also necessary for the existence of the representation follows as in the case of …nite I. The necessity of Axiom 8 follows immediately from the countable additivity of the measure .
